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Finite-Key Effects in Quantum Access Networks
with Wireless Links
Sima Bahrani, Osama Elmabrok, Guillermo Curra´s Lorenzo, and Mohsen Razavi
School of Electronic and Electrical Engineering, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK
Abstract—The finite-key effects in quantum access networks
are studied. We consider a quantum-classical network where
each user is equipped with a certain wavelength to exchange
secure keys, using quantum key distribution techniques, and
another one to exchange classical data. Users are connected to the
central office via a passive optical network. The quantum users
are connected to the fiber links via an indoor wireless channel.
We investigate the regimes of operation within which a secure
key can be exchanged in a reasonable amount of time. We find
out that by properly designing the system, it is possible to run
both quantum and classical systems at their full capacity.
Index Terms—Quantum key distribution, optical wireless com-
munications, passive optical networks, DWDM.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquitous adoption of online services in our daily lives
would have not been possible without the development of
mobile and wireless communications. Such systems have made
the access to the network such convenient that any new tech-
nology needs to find a way to adapt itself to such platforms.
The issue of data security is, nevertheless, an important matter
especially when it comes to wireless communications. One of
the enabling technologies that can provide us with future-proof
security is that of quantum key distribution (QKD), where the
security of the key exchange between legitimate users—a pre-
requisite for many cryptography applications—is guaranteed
by the laws of quantum mechanics. QKD systems have been
developed and tested across different media, but, in order to
hit the large market of public customers, they have to take
one more step and become available to mobile and wireless
users. The initial steps toward this end have already been
taken. Key exchange between a handheld device and an ATM
has been demonstrated [1], [2] and chip-based prototypes are
being developed [3]–[5]. Feasibility studies have also been
done to show the possibility of providing QKD services in
indoor environments under controlled light conditions [6],
and then to connect such wireless users to the central office
in a passive optical network (PON) [7]. The latter scenario
has, however, been studied only in the asymptotic case when
infinitely many key bits have been exchanged between the two
users. In practice, we would like to exchange a secret key in
a finite span of time, which requires us to study the feasibility
of such systems under finite-size key conditions. This paper
addresses such finite-key effects in a quantum-classical access
network that relies on hybrid wireless-fiber links.
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A wireless QKD system must overcome certain challenges
before being implemented. The first of such issues is the
background noise in the environment. QKD systems inherently
operate in the low-photon-number regime, which implies that
even a fraction of a background photon collected by the
receiver can reduce the rate or possibly make the QKD system
insecure. That may imply that, even for an indoor system,
certain lighting conditions must hold for a QKD system to op-
erate. Another challenge is with the use of wide beams, which
makes a mobile device more accessible, but causes additional
loss in the channel. The latter will be costly for our few-
photon signals. Once we couple QKD signals to optical fibers
and multiplex them with classical data channels, additional
loss, due to the nature of PONs, and background noise, due
to the Raman noise generated by data channels, must also
be tolerated. These all contribute to a hostile environment for
QKD operation. Luckily, it has been shown that by proper
use of beam steering techniques, and under controlled light
conditions, there would be regimes of operation in which
secure exchange of keys would asymptotically be possible [7].
That corresponds to the limit when infinitely many key bits
have been exchanged.
The number of bits exchanged in a QKD protocol is
important because such systems rely on parameter estimation
for the detection of eavesdroppers, error reconciliation, and
privacy amplification. This is often done by measuring the
rate of a certain event, e.g. an error in the key, by counting
the number of bits in error and dividing it by the length
of the key. Such a rate parameter would not, however, be
identical to the underlying probability that we need to know
in order to reliably do the above tasks. The rates would
approach their corresponding probabilities only when we are
in the asymptotic limit of exchanging infinitely many key
bits. In a practical scenario that the block size of exchanged
key bits is finite, we need rigorous techniques by which the
underlying probabilities can be bounded within an interval
around the observed/measured rate. If the chance of lying
outside such an interval is less than a security parameter ε,
then we can guarantee that the failure probability for our QKD
system, because of this estimation process, is below ε, and that
would quantify our confidence in the security of our QKD
system. Initial techniques for bounding the failure probability
was based on assuming Gaussian statistics for the parameters
of interest [8]. Such techniques could not provide us with
a rigorous proof of the system’s security, but could have
offered reasonable estimates for achievable key rates. It has
recently been shown that by the use of Chernoff and Hoeffding
inequalities one can come up with rigorous techniques for
bounding the relevant parameters of interest [9]. In particular,
by the use of the multiplicative form of Chernoff bounds, it
can be shown that we can come very close to the tight bounds
obtained from the Gaussian approximation [10].
In this paper, we look at a quantum-classical access network,
where the quantum users are operating in an indoor wireless
environment. The wireless QKD signals are coupled to an
optical fiber, and then multiplexed, using dense wavelength
division multiplexing (DWDM), with data channels for each
user. A DWDM PON structure then connects the users to the
central office. The question of interest for us is the time that it
takes for a QKD user to exchange a key of a certain size with
the central office, in the presence of Raman noise generated
by the data channels and the background noise collected in the
room. Looking at it from a different angle, we would like to
examine if any, or how much, secret keys can be exchanged
in this noisy environment within a reasonable time scale of a
few seconds to a few minutes. Longer time scales perhaps void
the whole purpose of using the wireless mode, and it might be
more practical to use a cable-based solution. A finite time for
key exchange requires us to revisit the security of our setup
using finite-key techniques. In this work, we use and extend
the results in [10] to achieve this objective.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we
describe the setup in detail. In Sec. III, we present the finite-
key analysis for the setup, and in Sec. IV, we present some
numerical results. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this paper, we consider a quantum-classical DWDM-
PON, as shown in Fig. 1. Such hybrid access networks enable
multiple users to exchange secret key bits with the central
office, in addition to transmitting their classical data. We
assume that there are D users in the system. The kth user
is allocated two wavelengths, λdk and λqk , corresponding
to classical and quantum signals, respectively. Each classical
channel uses the same wavelength for uplink and downlink
to transmit data with a launch power I via the fiber link.
The length of the fiber link between the central office and the
splitting point of users is denoted by L0, while the distance
between the splitting point and the kth user is denoted by Lk,
for k = 1, ..., D.
We assume that end users are working in an indoor environ-
ment. In principle, both the classical and quantum applications
can use wireless optical links for their operation. Here we only
focus on the quantum side of the game and assume that there
is no interference between the classical signals and quantum
ones in the wireless section of the link. To control the light
conditions, we consider a windowless room, illuminated by
a bulb at the center of the room. The wireless signals are
collected at the ceiling by a telescope, and will be coupled to
an optical fiber. This would result in an additional coupling
loss, denoted by ηcoup, but, instead, it enables the QKD user
to exchange the key with the central office without necessarily
trusting the optical equipment in the room. To reduce the
deteriorating effect of such a coupling process, we assume
Fig. 1. A quantum-classical access network with embedded wireless indoor
links.
that the QKD transmitter and the coupling node use beam
steering techniques to provide full alignment [7]. We assume
that the QKD transmitter is at the corner of the room, with a
semi-angle at half power of Φ1/2.
For our DWDM system, we assume that the wavelengths
available at the C-band, ranging from 1530 nm to 1565 nm,
are used. With the channel spacing of 100 GHz, there would
be 44 available channels. In order to allocate the channels to
the available wavelengths appropriately, one should consider
different sources of background noise generated by classical
channels at the quantum ones, e.g., Raman noise and adjacent
channel crosstalk. One possible setting is to assign the lowest
wavelengths of the system to quantum channels and the
largest ones to classical channels. While this method may
not be the optimal solution [11], it would place quantum
channels at the anti-stokes region of the Raman spectrum of
all classical channels. Also, to reduce the level of such Raman
noise at the quantum receivers, we assume the use of narrow
bandpass filters at the quantum channels. On the other hand,
adjacent channel crosstalk can be reduced by not allocating
quantum and classical channels to adjacent wavelengths. In
our setup, we assume that the two channels in the middle of
the wavelength grid are not in use, which leaves us with 42
available channels corresponding to a maximum number of
users of 21.
In our work, the decoy state BB84 protocol is used for the
QKD setups [12]. We assume that two decoy states are used,
where one of them has a mean photon number (intensity) of
ν and the other one is the vacuum state. The intensity of the
signal state, µ, is chosen to be larger than ν. The probabilities
of choosing these intensity levels are denoted by qs, qw, and
1 − (qs + qw), for the signal state, weak decoy state, and
vacuum state, respectively. As for the probabilities of Z and
X bases in the BB84 protocol, we assume efficient QKD
with asymmetrical probabilities Pz and Px = 1 − Pz . With
the transmission of N pulses in a QKD round by the QKD
transmitter, we can obtain an upper bound for the final key
rate. The free parameters µ, ν, qs, qw, and Pz , each has a
range of possible values. To achieve the highest possible key
rate, we optimize the key rate over these parameters.
III. FINITE-KEY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the finite-key analysis for the
system described in Sec. II. According to the GLLP analysis,
the final key length extracted from sifted bits in basis γ ∈
{z, x} is lower bounded by [13]:
Kγ ≥Msγ1 [1− h(e
psγ
1 )]− fM
sγh(Esγ), (1)
where f ≥ 1 denotes the error correction inefficiency and
h(p) = −plog2(p)− (1−p)log2(1−p) is the Shannon binary
entropy function. In (1), the superscript “s” represents the
signal state; Msγ , Esγ ,Msγ1 , and e
psγ
1 , respectively, represent
the number of successful detection events, the quantum bit
error rate, the number of successful detection events from
single-photon components, and the phase error rate of single-
photon components in basis γ of the signal state. The first
two parameters would specify how much error correction is
needed. In practice, one can just measure how many parity bits
are used in the error correction to exactly specify the cost of
error correction in (1). The single-photon parameters should,
however, be rigorously bounded to make sure that sufficient
privacy amplification is in place. By using the decoy-state
method, we can obtain a lower bound on Msγ1 , denoted by
MsγL1 , and an upper bound on e
psγ
1 , denoted by e
psγU
1 , and
use them in (1). The final key length, in bits, obtained from z
and x bases would then be K = Kz +Kx.
The vacuum+weak decoy-state protocol uses three inten-
sity levels corresponding to the signal state, weak decoy
state, and vacuum decoy state, to generate pulses and en-
code key bits. In [10], it is shown that by using the set
A = {Msγ , EsγMsγ ,Mwγ , EwγMwγ ,Mυγ , EυγMυγ} of
observed parameters, the single-photon parameters MsγL1 and
epsγU1 can be obtained. Here, the superscripts “w” and “υ”
represent weak decoy state and vacuum decoy state, respec-
tively. In the following, we summarize the key steps in [10]
and apply it to our problem.
In [10], the Chernoff bound is used to calculate upper
and lower bounds on averages of our observables in A, i.e.,
EL[Msγ ],EU [Msγ ], ...,EL[EvγMvγ ],EU [EvγMvγ ], in such
a way that Pr{EL[χ] < E[χ] < EU [χ]} ≥ 1 − ε, for any
χ ∈ A. ε will then be the failure probability in this case. For
an observable value χ > 0, it has been shown that
EL[χ] =
χ
1 + δL
(2)
and
EU [χ] =
χ
1− δU
, (3)
where δL and δU is calculated by solving the following two
equations: (
eδ
L
(1 + δL)(1+δL)
) χ
1+δL
=
ε
2
(4)
(
e−δ
U
(1− δU )(1−δU )
) χ
1−δU
=
ε
2
. (5)
For χ = 0, the bounds are EL[χ] = 0 and EU [χ] = −ln(ε/2).
The lower bound on Mγ1 and the upper bound on e
bγ
1 , where
ebγ1 is the bit error rate of single-photon components in basis
γ, are given by:
MγL1 = Y
γL
1 N
γ(e−µµqs + e
−ννqw), (6)
ebγU1 =
EU [EwγMwγ ]
qwNγ
eν − E
L[EυγMυγ ]
(1−qs−qw)Nγ
Y γL1 ν
, (7)
where
Y γL1 =
µ
µν − ν2
(
(
EL[Mwγ ]
qwNγ
)eν − (
EU [Msγ ]
qsNγ
)eµ
ν2
µ2
−(
EU [Mυγ ]
(1− qs − qw)Nγ
)
µ2 − ν2
µ2
)
. (8)
In the above equations, Nγ = P 2γN , where Pγ is the
probability of choosing basis γ and N is the block size.
The next step is the calculation of MsγL1 . To this aim,
we note that E[Msγ1 ] = p
sγ
1 M
γ
1 , where p
sγ
1 is the condi-
tional probability that a single-photon state corresponds to
a coherent pulse with intensity µ (signal state). By applying
the symmetric form of the Chernoff bound for the parameter
χ¯ = psγ1 M
γL
1 , a lower bound for M
sγ
1 can be obtained.
The final step is finding an upper bound on the phase error
rate of single-photon components from the signal state in each
basis, denoted by epsγU1 . In [10], random sampling method has
been used to calculate the upper bound epszU1 using e
bxU
1 . The
same approach can be used to calculate epsxU1 using e
bzU
1 .
For more details on the finite key analysis of vacuum+weak
decoy-state protocol, please refer to [10].
As mentioned in the previous section, the final key rate
should be optimized over possible range of values for pa-
rameters µ, ν, qs, qw, and Pz . To solve this multivariate
optimization problem, we can start by an appropriate initial set
of values, and optimize the parameters one by one, assuming
that other parameters are constant. This process should be
iterated until we converge to a specific set of values for our
parameters.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the system
described in Sec. II by providing some numerical results. We
use a DWDM-PON system with 100 GHz channel spacing.
We assume that users 1 to D are, respectively, allocated
wavelengths λq1 = 1530 nm to λqD = 1530+0.8(D−1) nm
on the wavelength grid for key exchange, and λd1 = 1564.4−
0.8(D − 1) nm to λdD = 1564.4 nm for data transmission.
As for the relevant distances, we assume that L0 = 5 km
and Lk = 500 m, for k = 1, ..., D. In our indoor wireless
environment, we assume that the QKD transmitter is located
at the corner of the room and its beam is directed toward the
QKD receiver, such that full alignment is maintained between
the two nodes. The semi-angle at half power of the QKD
source is assumed to be Φ1/2 = 1
◦. Furthermore, the QKD
receiver’s field of view (FOV) is assumed to be 6◦. Other
nominal values for the parameters of our system are listed in
Table I, which are all attainable by today’s established QKD
technologies.
TABLE I
NOMINAL VALUES USED FOR SYSTEM PARAMETERS.
Parameter Value
Quantum Efficiency 0.3
Receiver dark count rate 1E-6 ns−1
Error correction inefficiency, f 1.22
Misalignment probability, ed 0.033
Detector gate interval and pulse width 100 ps
Fiber attenuation coefficient 0.2 dB/km
AWG insertion loss 2 dB
Coupling loss, ηcoup 10 dB
Repetition rate of QKD setup 1 GHz
In order to calculate the key rate, in this section, we assume
that the measured values for the observable parameters χ in
set A match that of the asymptotic limit scenario, when no
eavesdropper is present. These asymptotic values have been
calculated based on the analysis, and parameter values, in [7],
in which the effect of various sources of noise including the
Raman noise and bulb noise is considered. For any such value
of χ, we then follow the prescription in (2)–(8) to find the
relevant key parameters in the finite-key regime. We then use
the obtained lower and upper bounds in (1) to find an upper
bound on the key rate.
One of the key applications of wireless indoor QKD could
be in topping up the key bank that users may keep on their
portable devices. For such an application, a fair requirement
is that the time that it takes for the user to top up should not
be excruciatingly long. If the key exchange takes too long, the
user may prefer to use an alternative method, e.g. a cable-based
solution, for that matter. A limited time for key exchange, plus
a finite pulse rate for photon transmission, implies that the
block size we can use for key distribution is of finite size.
In this section, we first attempt to answer two questions: (1)
For a target secret key size, S, how much time is needed to
establish the key? and (2) for a fixed given amount of time for
key exchange, how many key bits can securely be exchanged?
In both cases, we neglect the time that it takes for establishing
the connection as well as that needed for post-processing.
In order to answer the above questions, we first study how
the key rate depends on the employed block size as shown
in Fig. 2(a). We consider a quantum-classical DWDM-PON
with 20 users, where the launch power for data channels is on
average −30 dBm. This is typically sufficient to guarantee an
error rate below 10−9 for data channels. Because of the Raman
noise generated by the data channels and its non-uniform
distribution, different quantum channels experience different
levels of background noise. In Fig. 2(a), and all other examples
in this section, we have chosen the worst case scenario and
present the key rate for the QKD user with the lowest secret
key generation rate. As can be seen in Fig. 2(a), the secret key
rate per pulse in this channel increases by increasing the block
size, until it reaches its asymptotic limit of 4.3×10−4 b/pulse
for very large block sizes. There are two observations to make
in this figure. First, it can be seen that for a block size around
108 and less, the secure exchange of keys is not possible. That
is, if the time that we have for key exchange is below a certain
threshold, it would not be possible to exchange a secret key
at all. The second observation is that if we need to work near
the asymptotic limit, the time needed for key exchange could
be unreasonably long. For instance, at a clock rate of 1 GHz
for our QKD system, even a block size of 1012 pulses takes
1000 s to transmit, which implies that the user should allocate
nearly 20 minutes to finish the key exchange.
Another way to look at the above problem is to work out for
a target key size S, what block size, and correspondingly how
much time is needed for key exchange. Figure 2(b) provides
an answer to this question, in which the size of the final key,
i.e., K is plotted versus N . It can be seen in this figure that
for any fixed target key length, there would be an optimal
block size. For example, for S = 107, our optimal choice for
block size is about 6× 1010 and the required time is about 1
minute. This length of key is large enough to refresh the seed
in an AES-256 protocol nearly 40,000 times. It is possible to
exchange shorter keys as well, but the longer the key the more
time-efficient the key exchange will become.
Next, let us fix the key exchange duration and see how
that would affect other system parameters. We have chosen
this fixed time to be 100 s, which, at a clock rate of 1 GHz,
corresponds to N = 1011. One of the key parameters that
needs to be set in such a hybrid network is the launch power
for data channels. On the one hand, we do not want this
parameter to be too low, or otherwise, our data channels will
not be reliable. Choosing I to be too high, however, would
result in a large amount of Raman noise, which dismantles
the QKD operation, henceforth reducing the number of QKD
users we can support. Figure 3 depicts the maximum possible
number of users that can be supported for different values
of launch power. It can be seen that for I < −22 dBm, it
is possible to use the system at its full capacity. For launch
powers larger than −22 dBm, the number of users drops
sharply. For example, for I = −20 dBm, the maximum
possible number of users reduces from 21 to 15. Within the
parameters of our setup, the maximum toelrable launch power
is 0.1 mW, which is one order of magnitude lower than the
typical 1 mW power used in optical communications systems.
This will indicate that the needs of quantum communications
applications need to be accounted for in the design of future
hybrid quantum-classical networks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered a quantum-classical access
network with wireless indoor links. In this system, users were
connected via wireless links to a DWDM PON structure. We
investigated the possibility of exchanging secret key bits in
a reasonable time of up to a few minutes by considering the
finite-size key effects in our analysis. Our numerical results
showed that by a careful specification of system parameters,
such as launch power, block size and coupling loss, key
exchange was feasible within practical times limits for a
wireless user. In particular, we showed that the choice of
launch power for data channels can significantly affect the
number of QKD users that can be supported by the network.
Proper initialization of the system is then required to allow
expansion if needed.
Fig. 2. (a) Secret key rate per pulse for different values of block size. (b)
Final key length for different values of block size.
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Fig. 3. Maximum number of QKD users that can be supported at different
values of launch power.
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